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Distributed Synthesis of Surveillance Strategies for Mobile Sensors
Suda Bharadwaj1 and Rayna Dimitrova2 and Ufuk Topcu1
Abstract— We study the problem of synthesizing strategies
for a mobile sensor network to conduct surveillance in part-
nership with static alarm triggers. We formulate the problem
as a multi-agent reactive synthesis problem with surveillance
objectives specified as temporal logic formulas. In order to avoid
the state space blow-up arising from a centralized strategy com-
putation, we propose a method to decentralize the surveillance
strategy synthesis by decomposing the multi-agent game into
subgames that can be solved independently. We also decompose
the global surveillance specification into local specifications for
each sensor, and show that if the sensors satisfy their local
surveillance specifications, then the sensor network as a whole
will satisfy the global surveillance objective. Thus, our method
is able to guarantee global surveillance properties in a mobile
sensor network while synthesizing completely decentralized
strategies with no need for coordination between the sensors.
We also present a case study in which we demonstrate an
application of decentralized surveillance strategy synthesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of surveillance in our daily life has been
constantly growing in the past couple of decades, and with
that, also the need for more efficient and sophisticated
mechanisms for surveillance. One of the major challenges
comes from the need to perform surveillance in large and
complex environments, where it is not always feasible or
cost effective to have complete surveillance coverage of
the entire area at all times. Furthermore, sensors might not
always be able to classify threats, and often require human
intervention to assess the threat level. It can thus be necessary
to deploy multiple mobile sensors, that work together with
conventional static sensors to maintain a sufficient level of
knowledge on the location of a potential threat. This is
particularly crucial in applications where it is necessary to
monitor a potential threat which can move over a large area
until it can be accounted for.
In a formal setting, designing a surveillance strategy
for a (mobile) sensor network dealing with a potentially
adversarial target can be modelled as a two-player game
in which one player represents the sensor network and
the other player represents the adversary. There are several
variants of such games, including pursuit-evasion games [1]
and graph-searching games [2]. In such games, the problem
is formulated as enforcing eventual detection, which is, in
essence, a search problem – once the target is detected,
the game ends. These types of games are too restrictive for
applications where the goal is not to capture, but instead to
maintain information about the location of the adversary for
an unbounded time horizon.
1Suda Bharadwaj and Ufuk Topcu are with the University of Texas at
Austin
2Rayna Dimitrova is with the University of Leicester, UK.
Another class of games used in physical security are
Stackelberg games, also known as leader-follower games. In
such games the defender acts first, for example by placing
their defence system, and the attacker follows with his action,
possibly after obtaining information about the placed defence
system. In recent years Stackelberg games have seen use in,
among others, LAX airport, [3] and the US Coast Guard [4].
These games aim to compute randomized policies for the de-
fender to protect target locations from an attacker. Extensions
of this model [5] have been proposed to generate infinite-
horizon patrolling strategies either for mobile resources alone
or in concert with static alarm triggers [6], [7]. However,
these models cannot be used to reason about the uncertain
set of possible locations of dynamic threats.
Our objective in this work is not to just compute a
patrolling strategy for the mobile sensors, but also to quantify
the sensor network’s knowledge of the possible locations of
active threats and use this information to synthesize strategies
for the mobile sensors that provide knowledge guarantees on
the threat location over an infinite-time horizon.
As a motivating case study we consider the use of au-
tonomous drones working in cooperation with static sen-
sors in wildlife conservation. UAVs are increasingly being
adopted for monitoring of illegal hunting and poaching [8],
though they are mostly remotely controlled [9]. In Kenya,
for example, remotely controlled drones were deployed in
2014 in an attempt to reduce poaching by providing constant
surveillance [10], allowing authorities to arrest rhino poach-
ers when they are sensed by the drones. Autonomous UAVs
have not been used in this setting yet, and proposed plans
involve drones following pre-programmed paths [11]. In this
paper, we propose a method for automatically construct-
ing autonomous reactive surveillance strategies for multiple
mobile sensors (like UAVs) working in concert with static
sensors in the field.
We study the problem of synthesizing strategies for enforc-
ing temporal surveillance objectives, such as the requirement
to never let the sensor network’s uncertainty about the
target’s location exceed a given threshold, or recapturing
the target every time it escapes. To this end, we consider
surveillance objectives specified in linear temporal logic
(LTL), equipped with basic surveillance predicates. Our
computational model is that of a two-player game played
on a finite graph, whose nodes represent the joint possible
locations of all the mobile sensors and the target, and whose
edges model the possible (deterministic) moves between
locations. The mobile sensors play the game with partial
information, as they can only observe the target when it is in
the area of sight of one of the sensors. The target, on the other
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hand, always has full information about the locations of all
sensors in the network. In that way, we consider a model with
one-sided partial information, making the computed strategy
for the agent robust against a potentially more powerful
adversary.
We formulate surveillance strategy synthesis as the prob-
lem of computing a joint winning strategy for the multi-
ple mobile sensors in a partial-information game with a
surveillance objective. Partial-information games with LTL
objectives have been well studied [12], [13] and it is well
known that the synthesis problem is EXPTIME-hard [14],
[15]. In a companion publication at CDC 2018 we de-
scribe a framework for formalizing single-agent surveillance
synthesis as a two-player game with partial information,
and propose an abstraction-based method for solving such
games. The interested reader is referred to the extended
version [16] for details about the abstraction-based synthesis
method. The price of resorting to abstraction is the potential
overapproximation of the set of possible target locations
(that is, loss of precision in the sensors’ knowledge) which
may make satisfying the surveillance requirements more
difficult. There is thus a trade-off between the strictness of
the surveillance requirements, i.e, how closely a target needs
to be tracked, and the size of the abstract game necessary
for a surveillance strategy to exist.
Sensor networks consisting of a large number of dynamic
sensors, as well as static sensors, can achieve better coverage,
and thus, in general, can make do with much coarser abstrac-
tions to satisfy a given surveillance objective. However, even
when using abstraction, the size of the game is exponential in
the number of sensors. To address the blow-up of the state
space incurred by a large number of sensors, we propose
a decentralized synthesis method that aims to compute a
surveillance strategy for each mobile sensor separately.
Contribution: Our contribution is as follows. We decom-
pose the original surveillance game into a set of subgames,
one for each sensor. Accordingly, the global surveillance ob-
jective is broken up into a local objective for each subgame.
Our reduction guarantees that if the local strategy in each
subgame satisfies the local surveillance objective, then the
composition of the strategies fulfills the global surveillance
objective. This allows us to solve each subgame under its
local surveillance objective independently, using off-the-shelf
reactive synthesis tools.
There has been work in decentralized synthesis for GR(1)
specifications, however, the synthesis process often involves
a centralized computation as in [17] or synchronization [18],
[19]. Our approach, on the other hand is fully decentralized
and the sensors require no coordination as simply satisfying
their local properties guarantees the global objective.
II. MOTIVATING CASE STUDY
We first describe the multi-agent surveillance synthesis
problem informally, in the context of a motivating case study.
We consider wildlife conservation in Africa, in particular,
at the Selous Game Reserve (SGR) located in Tanzania,
where the African Black Rhinoceros population is under
(a) SGR interior landscape.
[20]
(b) Grid representation
of the landscape in 1a.
Fig. 1: The landscape in 1a is coarsely represented as the
gridworld in 1b. The red regions represent impassable terrain.
The yellow areas are the ones covered by static sensors.
serious threat due to poaching. We are motivated by a
recommended anti-poaching initiative in the SGR by the
World Heritage Centre, to study the use of a sensor network
for tracking the position of a potential poacher with user-
specified precision. Since the SGR is a very large area, the
network consists of both mobile and static sensors. We apply
the distributed synthesis method proposed in this paper to
synthesize surveillance strategies for the mobile sensors that
satisfy the desired tracking requirement.
Figure 1 shows a section of the SGR that we represent
as a gridworld which will form the state space of the game.
Each static sensor monitors a given area of the grid (shown in
yellow) and detects any presence of the target (i.e., threat) in
these states, but cannot determine the target’s exact location.
The requirement is to ensure that over and over again, the set
of potential locations of the target is reduced to 5 cells. In
other words, every time the target escapes from the vision
of all sensors, the network guarantees that eventually the
uncertainty about its position will be reduced to 5 grid cells.
III. GAMES WITH SURVEILLANCE OBJECTIVES
We begin by providing a formal model for describing
multi-agent surveillance strategy synthesis problems, in the
form of a two-player game between the mobile sensors in
a network and a target, in which the sensors have partial
information about the target’s location.
A. Multi-Agent Surveillance Game Structures
We define a multi-agent surveillance game structure to be
a tuple G = (S, sinit, T, vis1, . . . , visn) where:
• S = Ls×Lt is the set of states, where Ls = L1×L2×
· · · × Ln is the set of joint locations of the n mobile
sensors, Li is the set of possible locations of sensor i,
and Lt is the set of possible locations of the target;
• sinit = (linit1 , . . . , l
init
n , l
init
t ) is the initial state;
• T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation describing the
possible joint moves of the sensors and the target; and
• vis1, . . . , visn are the visibility functions for the n
sensors, where visi : Li × Lt → B maps a state (li, lt)
to true iff position lt is in the area of sight of li.
Additionally, we define the joint visibility function Vis :
S → B that maps a state (l, lt) to true iff the set I = {i |
visi(li, lt) = true} is non-empty. Informally, Vis(ls, lt) is
true if the target is in view of at least one of the sensors.
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24
(a) Surveillance arena
((20, 4), {18})→

((15, 3), {19, 23})
((21, 9), {19})
((21, 9), {17})
((15, 9), {19})
(b) Some possible transitions from the initial
state in the belief-set game from Example 2.
Note that, since the set of static sensors is
empty, it is omitted from the states. For the sake
of readability, some transitions are excluded.
Fig. 2: A simple surveillance game on a grid arena. Obstacles
are shown in red. There are two sensors (at locations 20 and
4) coloured in blue and green respectively and the target
(at location 18) is orange. The grey states are not visible to
either sensor, i.e, Vis((20, 4, lt)) = false for all grey lt.
The transition relation T encodes the one-step move of the
target and the n sensors: First, the target makes a move, and
then, the sensors move jointly in a synchronized manner.
We denote with T↓i the projection of the transition relation
T on the sets of locations of the target and the sensor with
index i. Formally, we define T↓i = {((li, lt), (l′i, l′t)) ∈
(Li × Lt)2 | ∃l1, l′1, . . . , li−1, l′i−1, li+1, l′i+1, . . . , ln, l′n :
((l1, . . . , ln, lt), (l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n, l
′
t)) ∈ T}.
For a state (ls, lt) ∈ S we define succt(ls, lt) to be the set
of possible successor locations of the target:
succt(ls, lt) = {l′t ∈ Lt | ∃l′s. ((ls, lt), (l′s, l′t)) ∈ T}.
We extend succt to sets of locations of the target by
stipulating that for L ⊆ Lt, the set succt(ls, L) consists
of all possible successor locations of the target for states in
{ls} × L. Formally, let succt(ls, L) =
⋃
lt∈L succt(ls, lt).
For a state (ls, lt) and a successor location of the target l′t,
we denote with succ(ls, lt, l′t) the set of successor locations
of the sensors, given that the target moves to l′t:
succ(ls, lt, l
′
t) = {l′s ∈ Ls | ((ls, lt), (l′s, l′t)) ∈ T}.
We assume that, for every state s ∈ S, there exists a
state s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ T , that is, from every state
there is at least one move possible (including self transitions).
We also assume, that when the target moves to an invisible
location, its position does not influence the possible one-
step moves of the sensors. Formally, we require that if
Vis(ls, l
′
t) = Vis(ls, l̂
′
t) = false , then succ(ls, lt, l
′
t) =
succ(ls, l̂t, l̂t
′
) for all lt, l′t, l̂t, l̂
′
t ∈ Lt. This assumption is
natural in the setting where each of the sensors can move in
one step only to locations that are in its sight.
Example 1: Figure 2 shows an example of a multi-agent
surveillance game on a grid. The sets of possible locations Li
and Lt for the each of the sensors and for the target consist
of the squares of the grid. The transition relation T encodes
the possible one-step moves of all the sensors and the target
on the grid, and incorporates all desired constraints. For
example, moving to a location occupied by another sensor or
the target, or to an obstacle, is not allowed. In this example,
the function visi encodes straight-line visibility with a range
of 2: a location lt is visible to sensor i from location li if
there is no obstacle on the straight line between them and the
distance between the target and sensor i is not larger than 2.
Initially the target is not in the area of sight of the sensors,
but the initial position of the target is known. However, once
the target moves to one of the locations reachable in one step,
in this case, locations 17, 19 and 23, this might no longer be
the case. More precisely, if the target moves to location 17,
then the green sensor observes its location, but if it moves to
one of the other locations, then neither sensor can observe
it, and its exact location will not be known. 
B. Static Sensors
We now describe a way to incorporate static sensors in the
multi-agent surveillance game framework. Let G be a multi-
agent surveillance game structure as defined previously.
We identify a static sensor with a set of locations Λ ⊆
Lt over which it operates. A surveillance game can have
multiple static sensors (or none). LetM = {Λ1, . . . ,Λm} be
a given set of m static sensors for G. For each location lt ∈
Lt we define J(lt) to be the set of all indices of static sensors
such that lt belongs to the corresponding set of locations, i.e,
J(lt) = {j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | lt ∈ Λj}. We refer to J(lt) as the
set of triggered static sensors at location lt. We also define
J(L) =
⋃
lt∈L J(lt) for a set of locations L ⊆ Lt.
We assume that sensors do not suffer from false positives
or negatives (studying these is an avenue for future work).
C. Belief-Set Game Structures
In surveillance strategy synthesis, we need to state proper-
ties of, and reason about, the information which the sensors
have, i.e, the belief about the location of the target. To
this end, we can employ a powerset construction which is
commonly used to transform a partial-information game into
a perfect-information one, by explicitly tracking the joint
knowledge of the sensors as a set of possible locations of
the target. In that way we define a two-player game in which
one player represents the whole sensor network, and the other
player represents the target.
Given a set A, we denote with P(A) = {A′ | A′ ⊆ A}
the powerset (set of all subsets) of A.
Given a multi-agent surveillance game structure G =
(S, sinit, T, vis1, . . . , visn) with m static sensors M =
{Λ1, . . . ,Λm}, we define the corresponding belief-set game
structure Gbelief = (Sbelief , sinitbelief , Tbelief) where:
• Sbelief = Ls×P(Lt)×P({1, . . . ,m}) is the set of states,
where Ls is the set of joint locations of the sensors, and
P(Lt) the set of belief sets describing information about
the location of the target, and P({1, . . . ,m}) is the set
of possible sets of triggered sensors;
• sinitbelief = (l
init
1 , . . . , l
init
n , {linitt }, J(linitt )) is initial state;
• Tbelief ⊆ Sbelief × Sbelief is the transition relation where
((ls, Bt, J), (l
′
s, B
′
t, J
′)) ∈ Tbelief iff l′s ∈ succ(ls, lt, l′t)
for some lt ∈ Bt and l′t ∈ B′t , J ′ ⊆ J(B′t), and one of
the following three conditions is satisfied:
(1) B′t = {l′t}, l′t ∈ succt(ls, Bt), Vis(ls, l′t) = true;
(2) B′t = {l′t ∈ succt(ls, Bt) | Vis(ls, l′t) = false} ∩⋂
j∈J′ Λj , and J
′ 6= ∅;
(3) B′t = {l′t ∈ succt(ls, Bt) | Vis(ls, l′t) = false} \⋃m
j=1 Λj , and J
′ = ∅.
Condition (1) captures the successor locations of the target
that can be observed from one of the mobile sensors’ current
locations. Condition (2) captures the cases when the target
moves to a location that cannot be observed by the mobile
sensors, but triggers a non-empty set J ′ of static sensors.
Finally, condition (3) corresponds to the successor locations
of the target not visible from the current location of any of
the mobile sensors, and not triggering any static sensors.
Example 2: Consider the surveillance game structure
from Example 1. The initial belief set is {18}, as the target’s
initial position is known. Figure 2b shows some of the
successor states of the state ((20, 4), {18}) in Gbelief . 
Based on Tbelief , we can define the functions succt :
Sbelief → P(P(Lt) × P({1, . . . ,m})) and succ : Sbelief ×
P(Lt) × P({1, . . . ,m}) → P(Ls) similarly to the corre-
sponding functions defined for G.
A run in Gbelief is an infinite sequence s0, s1, . . . of states
in Sbelief , where s0 = sinitbelief and (si, si+1) ∈ Tbelief for all i.
A strategy for the target in Gbelief is a function ft :
S+belief → P(Lt) × P({1, . . . ,m}) such that ft(pi · s) =
(Bt, J) implies (Bt, J) ∈ succt(s) for every pi ∈ S∗belief
and s ∈ Sbelief . That is, a strategy for the target suggests a
move resulting in some belief set reachable from a location
in the current belief, and a set of triggered sensors.
A joint strategy for the sensors in Gbelief is a function
fs : S
+
belief ×P(Lt)→ Sbelief such that, if, fs(pi · s,Bt, J) =
(l′s, Bt, J
′) then, B′t = Bt, J
′ = J , and l′s ∈ succ(s,Bt) for
every pi ∈ S∗belief , s ∈ Sbelief and Bt ∈ P(Lt). Intuitively,
a strategy for the sensors suggests a joint move based on
the observed history of the play, the current belief about the
target’s position, and the set of currently triggered sensors.
The outcome of given strategies fs and ft for the sensors
and the target in Gbelief , denoted outcome(Gbelief , fs, ft), is
a run s0, s1, . . . of Gbelief such that for every i ≥ 0, we have
si+1 = fs(s0, . . . , si, B
i
t), where B
i
t = ft(s0, . . . , si).
D. Temporal Surveillance Objectives
We consider a set of surveillance predicates SP = {pb |
b ∈ N>0}, where for b ∈ N>0 we say that a state (ls, Bt) in
the belief game structure satisfies pb (denoted (ls, Bt) |= pb)
iff |{lt ∈ Bt | Vis(ls, lt) = false}| ≤ b. Intuitively, pb is
satisfied by the states in the belief game structure where the
size of the belief set does not exceed the threshold b ∈ N>0.
We study surveillance objectives expressed in a fragment
of linear temporal logic (LTL) over surveillance predicates.
We consider safety surveillance objectives expressed using
the temporal operator and liveness surveillance objectives
expressed using the temporal operators and .
A safety surveillance objective pb requires that the size
of the belief-set never exceeds the given threshold b. More
formally, an infinite sequence of states s0, s1, . . . in Gbelief
satisfies the safety property pb if and only if for every
i ≥ 0 it holds that si |= pb. A liveness surveillance objective
pb, on the other hand, requires that the size of the belief
is smaller or equal to the bound b infinitely often. That is,
s0, s1, . . . in Gbelief satisfies pb if for every i ≥ 0 there
exists j ≥ i such that sj |= pb.
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24
(a) Multi-agent surveil-
lance game partitioned
into two subgames.
G1 : (20, 14)
(21, k1) (15, k1)(21, 19) (15, 19)
G2 : (4, k2)
(3, 9) (9, k2)(3, k2)(3, 5) (9, 5)
(b) Transitions from initial states in subgames.
Fig. 3: Partitioning of the state space of a surveillance game
into two subgames with locations L˜1 (green) and L˜2 (blue).
In this paper we consider safety and liveness surveillance
objectives, as well as conjunctions of such objectives. We
remark the following equivalences of surveillance objectives:
• pa ∧ pb ≡ pmin (a,b);
• pa ∧ pb ≡ pmin (a,b);
• if a ≤ b, then pa ∧ pb ≡ pa.
Using these equivalences, we can restrict our attention to
surveillance objectives of one the following forms: pb,
pb or pa ∧ pb, where a > b.
E. Multi-Agent Surveillance Synthesis Problem
A multi-agent surveillance game is a triple (G,M, ϕ),
where G is a surveillance game structure, M is a set of
static sensors, and ϕ is a surveillance objective. A winning
strategy for the sensors for (G,M, ϕ) is a joint strategy fs
for the sensors in the corresponding belief-set game structure
Gbelief such that for every strategy ft for the target in Gbelief
it holds that outcome(Gbelief , fs, ft) |= ϕ. Analogously, a
winning strategy for the target for (G,M, ϕ) is a strategy
ft such that, for every strategy fs for the mobile sensors in
Gbelief , it holds that outcome(Gbelief , fs, ft) 6|= ϕ.
Problem statement: Given a multi-agent surveillance
game (G,M, ϕ), compute a joint strategy for the mobile
sensors that is winning for the game (G,M, ϕ).
In the remainder of the paper we show how to solve the
multi-agent surveillance synthesis problem in a composi-
tional manner. The key idea is to decompose the problem
into a set of single-sensor surveillance games over smaller
sets of locations, and solve each of these games separately.
IV. DISTRIBUTED SURVEILLANCE GAMES
In the sequel we assume that L1 = L2 = · · · = Lt , L
in the surveillance game structure, i.e, all n sensors and the
target operate in the same state space. For the remainder of
the paper, let G = (S, sinit, T, vis1, . . . , visn) be a multi-
agent surveillance game structure defined over L, and let
M = {Λ1, . . . ,Λm} be a set of static sensors. We define a
state-space partition of size n of the set L of locations in a
game structure G to be a tuple L˜ = (L˜1, . . . , L˜n) of subsets
of Li such that
⋃n
i=1 L˜i = L, and L˜i ∩ L˜j = ∅ for i 6= j.
A. Surveillance Subgames
We now describe how, given a state-space partition L˜ =
(L˜1, . . . , L˜n), to construct a tuple of single-agent surveil-
lance game structures G˜ = (G1, . . . , Gn) that contains one
surveillance subgame Gi for each mobile sensor i. Each
subgame, Gi is defined over the subset of locations L˜i. Since
the target and sensors operate on the same state space we
will have L˜is = L˜
i
t = L˜i. Additionally, to each L˜
i
t we add an
auxiliary location ki that encapsulates all possible locations
of the target that are outside of this subgame’s region, i.e.,
all locations in L \ L˜i. We then model transitions leaving or
entering L˜it as transitions to or from location ki respectively.
We require that the initial location liniti of sensor i is in L˜i.
Formally, given a subset L˜i ⊆ L we define the sub-
game of G corresponding to sensor i as the tuple Gi =
(S˜i, s˜
init
i , T˜i, v˜isi) where:
• S˜i = L˜i × (L˜it ∪ ki) is the set of states.
• s˜initi = (l
init
i , l˜t) is the initial state, where l˜t = l
init
t , if
linitt ∈ L˜i, and l˜t = ki otherwise.
• The set T˜i consists of two types of transitions: the
transitions in T↓i that originate and end in the sub-
game’s region are preserved as they are. Transitions
of the target exiting or entering L˜it are replaced by
transitions to and from location ki respectively, since ki
represents all target locations outside of L˜it. Formally,
for every pair of states (l˜i, l˜t) ∈ S˜i and (l˜′i, l˜′t) ∈ S˜i
we have that ((l˜i, l˜t), (l˜′i, l˜
′
t)) ∈ T˜i if and only if there
exists a transition ((l˜i, lt), (l˜′i, l
′
t)) ∈ T↓i for which the
following conditions are satisfied:
– if l˜t ∈ L˜it and l˜′t ∈ L˜it, then l˜t = lt and l˜′t = l′t, that
is, we have a transition internal for the region L˜it;
– if l˜t ∈ L˜it and l˜′t = ki, then lt ∈ L˜it and l′t 6∈ L˜it,
that is, we have a transition exiting the region L˜it;
– if l˜t = ki and l˜′t ∈ L˜it, then lt 6∈ L˜it and l′t ∈ L˜it,
that is, we have a transition entering the region L˜it;
– if l˜t = ki and l˜′t = ki, then lt 6∈ L˜it and l′t 6∈ L˜it,
that is, we have a transition completely outside L˜it.
• The visibility function v˜isi in the subgame Gi agrees
with the visibility function visi of sensor i in the
original game when the target’s location is in the sub-
game’s region. Target locations outside of the region L˜it
(summarized by location ki) are invisible to the sensor
in the subgame. Formally, v˜isi(l˜i, lt) = visi(l˜i, lt) when
lt ∈ L˜it, and v˜isi(l˜i, lt) = false if lt = ki.
Example 3: In Figure 3a, we have two subgames: G1 for
the green mobile sensor and G2 for the blue one. The initial
states in the subgames are s1 = (20, 14), and s2 = (4, k2).
Recall that ki is an indicator state to represent that the target
is not subgame i. The transitions shown in Figure 3b show
that the target has the ability to leave G1 and enter G2. 
Note that in this construction, sensor i is not able to leave
the region of locations L˜i. Furthermore, all the information
about the target’s behaviour outside of the subgame’s region
is completely hidden from the mobile sensor controller, since
all locations outside of L˜it are represented by the single
location ki. In section IV-C, we discuss the local knowledge
(belief) of sensor i in the game structure Gi.
B. Static Sensors in Subgames
We assumed that all information about the target’s be-
haviour outside of subgame Gi is completely hidden from
sensor i. Hence, sensor i is only privy to static sensors that
operate in the state space of the subgame Gi, i.e, static
sensors Λm where Λm ∩ L˜i 6= ∅. For simplicity of the
presentation we assume that each static static sensor operates
in exactly one region Li. Our results can easily be extended
to the general case. We define Qi = {i | Λi ∩ L˜i 6= ∅} to be
the set of static sensors operating in the subgame Gi.
C. Local Beliefs in Surveillance Subgames
A surveillance subgame is a game structure with a single
mobile sensor and some number of static sensors, and thus,
is a special case of multi-agent surveillance game structure.
With this, the definition of belief-set game structures from
Section III-C directly applies to surveillance subgames.
In the belief-set game structure for a surveillance subgame
Gi = (S˜i, s˜
init
i , T˜i, v˜isi) with static sensors Qi, the belief
sets represent the local belief of sensor i. More specifically,
a belief set in Gibelief is an element of P(L˜it ∪ {ki}), and
can thus contain the auxiliary location. Intuitively, if ki is
present in the sensor’s current belief, then the target could
possibly be outside of the local set of locations L˜i, or if the
belief is the singleton {ki}, then sensor i knows for sure that
the target is outside of its region. Additionally, if there is a
triggered static sensor in the region, the sensor will know that
the target must be in the state space of the static sensor and ki
cannot be in the belief. Due to the definition of surveillance
subgames in Section IV-A, the location ki must be in the
belief of sensor i whenever it is possible that the target is
outside of its region. If n ≥ 2, then at every given time
ki must be in the belief set of at least one sensor (possibly
several). We define the global interpretation JBtK of a belief
set Bt in Gibelief , which is a set of locations in G, as
JBtK = {Bt if ki 6∈ Bt
Bt ∪ (L \ L˜i) if ki ∈ Bt.
Strategies of sensor i in the belief-set game Gibelief depend
only on the sequence of states in this game, and thus, only
on local information. Following the definitions in Section III-
C, the outcome of a pair of given strategies fi and fti for
the sensor and the target in Gibelief is a sequence of states in
Gibelief , each of which is a pair consisting of a location of
sensor i and a belief-set for sensor i in Gibelief .
D. Distributed Surveillance Synthesis Problem
Given a state-space partitioning L˜ and the corresponding
tuple of subgames G˜ = (G1, . . . , Gn) we will define a
distributed surveillance strategy synthesis problem, which,
intuitively, asks to synthesize strategies for the sensors in the
individual belief subgames, such that together they guarantee
the global surveillance objective. In this section we formalize
this intuitive problem description. We first need to define
what it means for the individual sensor strategies to jointly
satisfy together a global requirement.
The surveillance requirements are defined in terms of the
belief-states in Gbelief , but strategies in the belief subgames
are defined in terms of sequences of local belief states.
Hence, we need to define a mapping of states of the form
((l1, . . . , ln), Bt, J) to elements of P(L˜it ∪ {ki}) for each
i. Since, by definition, a strategy for sensor i in the corre-
sponding belief subgame guarantees that it remains in L˜i,
we only need to define the mapping for states li ∈ L˜i.
Formally, for a state ((l1, . . . , ln), Bt, J) in Gbelief
we define its projection on belief subgame i as
((l1, . . . , ln), Bt, J)↓i = (li, Bt↓i, J ∩Qi), where
Bt↓i =
{
Bt if Bt ⊆ L˜i,
(Bt ∩ L˜i) ∪ {ki} otherwise.
The mapping extends to sequences of states in the usual way.
Intuitively, this mapping projects the joint knowledge of
the sensors in Gbelief onto the local belief of each sensor,
where the sensors do not share their local beliefs with each
other, that is, the sensors have no information about the
target’s position outside of their own region. The global,
shared belief of the sensors is formed by the combination
of their local beliefs. More precisely, this is the intersection
of the global interpretation of the local beliefs. Indeed, it is
easy to see that the property Bt =
⋂n
i=1JBt↓iK holds.
Now we are ready to define the joint strategy of the
sensors in Gbelief obtained by executing together a given
set of sensor strategies in the individual subgames. Let
fs1 , . . . , fsn be strategies for the sensors in the belief
subgames (G1belief , . . . , G
n
belief). We define the composition
fs1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ fsn of fs1 , . . . , fsn , which is a joint strategy
fs for the sensors in Gbelief , as follows: for every sequence
s0, . . . , sk of states in Gbelief , global belief Bt ∈ P(Lt) and
set of triggered sensors J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, we let
fs(s0, . . . , sk, Bt, J) = (l1, . . . , ln),
where li = fsi((s0, . . . , sk)↓i, Bt↓i, J ∩Qi) for each i.
Remark. If, for some i, the projection (s0, . . . , sk)↓i is
undefined, then fs(s0, . . . , sk, Bt) is undefined. However,
by the definition of each fsi we are guaranteed that the
projection is defined for every prefix consistent with fsi .
Intuitively, the joint strategy fs1 ⊗ . . .⊗ fsn makes deci-
sions consistent with the choices of the individual strategies
fs1 , . . . , fsn in the respective belief subgames.
Our goal is to synthesize a joint strategy fs that enforces
a given surveillance property in the belief-set game Gbelief
by synthesizing individual strategies for all the sensors in the
corresponding belief subgames. That is, we want to solve the
following distributed surveillance synthesis problem.
Problem statement: Given a multi-agent surveillance
game (G,M, ϕ) with n sensors, and a state-space partition
L˜, compute strategies fs1 , . . . , fsn for the sensors in the
belief subgames G1belief , . . . , G
n
belief respectively, such that the
composed strategy fs1⊗ . . .⊗fsn is a joint winning strategy
for the sensors in the surveillance game (G,M, ϕ).
Thus, in the distributed surveillance synthesis problem
we have to compute strategies fs1 , . . . , fsn such that for
every strategy ft for the target in Gbelief it holds that
outcome(Gbelief , fs1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ fsn , ft) |= ϕ. To this end,
we have to provide local surveillance objectives for all the
sensors, such that if all strategies are winning with respect to
their local objectives, then their composition is winning with
respect to the original surveillance objective. In this way we
will reduce the multi-agent surveillance synthesis problem
to n single-agent surveillance problems over smaller sets of
locations. This reduction is the subject of the next section.
V. FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL SPECIFICATIONS
In order to reduce the multi-agent surveillance synthesis
problem for a given surveillance specification ϕ to solving
a number of single-sensor surveillance subgames, we need
to provide local surveillance objectives for the individual
subgames. The local objectives should be such that by
composing the strategies that are winning with respect to the
local objectives we should obtain a strategy that is winning
for the global surveillance objective. More precisely, we have
to provide local surveillance specifications ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such
that if for each i it holds that fsi is a winning strategy for
the sensor in (Gi, Qi, ϕi), then the strategy fs1 ⊗ . . .⊗ fsn
is a joint winning strategy for the sensors in (G,M, ϕ).
Recall that the surveillance objective ϕ is of the form
pb, or pb, or pa ∧ pb, where a > b. We will
provide translations for each of these types of specifications.
First, note that the belief sets in a belief subgame Gibelief
can contain the auxiliary location ki, which represents all
locations in L\L˜i. Thus, when the local belief set contains ki,
the size of the global belief set depends on the local beliefs
of the other agents as well. We have to account for this in
the translation from global into local surveillance objectives.
Example 4: Consider the global safety surveillance spec-
ification p5 in a network with two mobile sensors. In this
case we can reduce the multi-agent surveillance problem to
two single-agent surveillance games, each of which has p3
as the local specification. To see why, consider the two
possible cases of local belief set of sensor 1 whose size is
less than or equal to 3. If k1 is not part of the belief set of
sensor 1, then the target is definitely in the region of sensor
1, meaning that the global belief is of size less than or equal
to 3, and hence smaller that 5. If, on the other hand, k1 is
part of the local belief of sensor 1, then the target can be in
at most 2 locations in L˜1. If at the same time we have that
the local belief of sensor 2 is of size at most 3, this would
guarantee that the size of the global belief does not exceed 5.
Local specifications p4, on the other hand do not imply the
global specification. Indeed, if at a given point in time both
sensors have local beliefs of size 4, each of which contains
the corresponding location ki, the resulting global belief will
be of size 6 and thus violate the global specification. 
Generalizing the observations made in this example, for
any number of sensors n ≥ 2 and global safety surveillance
objective pb, we define the local safety surveillance ob-
jective for each of the sensors, denoted local( pb, n), as
local( pb, n) , pc, where c = b bnc+ 1. Since n ≥ 2 and
b > 0, we have c ≤ b.
Note that this translation is conservative, since if according
to the belief of sensor i the target could be outside its region,
it should guarantee that the number of locations in its own
region the target could be in is at most b bnc, even if the
target can possibly be in only one of the other regions. This
conservativeness is necessary to guarantee soundness in the
absence of coordination between the sensors.
We now turn to liveness surveillance objectives. It is easy
to see that each sensor guaranteeing a small enough local
belief infinitely often is not enough to satisfy the global
surveillance objective, since the local guarantees can happen
in time-steps different for the different sensors.
Example 5: Consider the global surveillance specification
p5 for a network with two sensors. Suppose f1 is a
strategy for the sensor in G1belief , which ensures that every
even step the size of the local belief is 10, and every odd step
the local belief contains k1 and its size is 3. Strategy f2 in
G2belief , is similar, but even and odd steps are interchanged:
every even step the local belief contains k2 and its size is 3,
and every odd step the size of the local belief is 10. Thus,
while f1 and f2 guarantee that their local belief is ”small
enough” infinitely often, they do this at different steps.
We circumvent the problem illustrated in this example by
requiring that each sensor satisfies the liveness guarantee on
its own. For this, we have to consider two cases. First, if from
some point on sensor i always knows that the target is outside
of its region, it has no obligation to satisfy the liveness
surveillance guarantee. If, on the other hand, according to
sensor i’s belief the target could be in L˜i infinitely often
(note that this is true for at least one sensor), then it has to
satisfy the corresponding liveness guarantee.
In order to capture this intuition, we need two additional
types of surveillance predicates. First, we need to be able
to express the negation of the property that the local belief
of sensor i is the singleton {ki} (which means that sensor i
knows that the target is outside L˜i). For this, we introduce
the predicate belief 6= {ki}. Second, in order to express the
local liveness guarantee, we need to be able to state that ki
is not in L˜i (which means that sensor i knows that the target
is in its region). The predicate we introduce for this property
is ki 6∈ belief . Both predicates can be interpreted over belief
sets similarly to pb and incorporated in LTL.
Formally, we define the local liveness specification for
sensor i denoted local i( pb) as
local i( pb) ,
(
(belief 6= {ki})
)→(
(pb ∧ (ki 6∈ belief ))
)
.
Note that the agent cannot trivially satisfy local i( pb),
since the belief set is defined precisely by it’s sequence of
observations and is not under the agent’s direct control.
This translation is again conservative, since it would
suffice that the liveness guarantee is satisfied by a single
sensor. However, these can be different sensors for different
behaviours of the target. Thus, we require that every sensor
i satisfies local i( pb). This requires that if the target
crosses from one region to another infinitely often, then both
sensors have to satisfy the liveness surveillance objective.
(a) The gridworld in 1b
partitioned into 6 subgames.
(b) The gridworld in 1b
partitioned into 3 subgames.
Fig. 4: Cases with 6 mobile sensors in Fig 4a and 3 mobile
sensors in Fig 4b. The mobile sensors are blue circles and
the target is represented in orange. Yellow regions represent
static sensors.The red cells represent impassable terrain (such
as dense foliage) that cannot be seen through by the sensors.
Black cells are locations not visible to any sensor.
Finally, for a global surveillance specification pa ∧
pb, the local surveillance specification for sensor i is
local i( pa ∧ pb, n) , local( pa, n) ∧ local i( pb).
Slightly abusing the notation, we denote with local i(ϕ, n)
the local surveillance specification for sensor i for any of the
three types of global surveillance specifications.
The next theorem, which follows from the definition of the
local specifications, states the soundness of the reduction.
Theorem 1: Let (G,M, ϕ) be a multi-agent surveillance
game with n sensors, where ϕ is of the form pb, or
pb, or pa ∧ pb, where a > b. Let L˜ be a state-
space partition. Suppose that f1, . . . , fn are strategies for
the sensors in the subgames G1belief , . . . , G
n
belief respectively,
such that for each sensor i the strategy fi is winning in the
surveillance game (Gi, Qi, local i(ϕ, n)). Then, it holds that
the composed strategy fs1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ fsn is a joint winning
strategy for the sensors in the surveillance game (G,M, ϕ).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We now return to the case study outlined in Section II.
We have implemented the proposed method in Python,
using the slugs reactive synthesis tool [21], and evaluated it
on the multi-agent surveillance game modelling the problem
described in Section II. The experiments were performed on
an Intel i5-5300U 2.30 GHz CPU with 8 GB of RAM.
We analyzed two scenarios. In Figure 4a, we have six
mobile sensors. We compare the surveillance strategy with
the situation in Figure 4b where we have three mobile
sensors. In both cases there are four static sensors depicted
in yellow in Figure 4. Our global surveillance task is p5,
i.e, we need to infinitely often bring the belief of the target
location to 5 cells or lower.
Solving either case centralized is not computationally
feasible as the state space grows exponentially with the
number of sensors - we will have in the order of 4006
and 4003 states respectively. Thus, we partition the multi-
agent surveillance game into subgames as shown in Figures
4a and 4b. We then solve each game individually with
(a) t8 (b) t12 (c) t16
(d) t18 (e) t20 (f) t22
Fig. 5: Figures 5a - 5f are chronological snapshots during
a simulation of the surveillance game in Figure 4b. Grey
regions represent the global belief of the target’s location.
local specifications local i( p5). We solve these single-
agent surveillance games using an abstraction-based method
detailed in a companion publication at CDC 2018, detailed
in [16]. We report the synthesis times in Table I.
TABLE I: Synthesis times for each surveillance subgame
Subgame Number of states Synthesis time (s)
6 sensors
Subgame 1 69 101
Subgame 2 74 206
Subgame 3 62 111
Subgame 4 52 88
Subgame 5 77 285
Subgame 6 66 64
Total 400 855
3 sensors
Subgame 1 142 473
Subgame 2 113 306
Subgame 3 145 372
Total 400 1151
The multi-agent surveillance game in Figure 4a results in
more subgames compared to the game in 4b. However, each
game is much smaller and strategies can be synthesized faster
in each subgame. Figure 5 shows snapshots in time of the
simulation of the 3 sensor surveillance game in Figure 4b.
The target is being controlled by a human and the sensors are
following their synthesized local surveillance strategies. The
global belief is depicted in Figure 5 as grey cells, meaning
that the combined knowledge of all the sensors has restricted
the location of the target into one of the grey cells.
We see, in Figures 5a - 5c, that the target is in the subgame
corresponding to sensor 2. Hence, only sensor 2 is moving
and trying to lower its belief to below 5 cells (which it does
in Figure 5d). In Figures 5b - 5d, the target starts moving
towards subgame 3 at which point the target is detected
by the static sensor in subgame 3 and sensor 3 takes over
in figures 5e - 5f. There is no coordination between any
of the agents, and each satisfy only their local surveillance
specification. However, our construction guarantees that the
global specification of p5 will be satisfied.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a method for decentralized synthesis of
surveillance strategies for a mobile sensor network working
together with static sensors. Problems that would otherwise
be computationally intractable can be solved by decomposing
the global game into local subgames for each sensor with
individual surveillance specifications. We show that although
each game is solved completely independently with no
information sharing, we can still guarantee global surveil-
lance properties. In future work we aim to incorporate false
positives in static alarm triggers as well as noisy observations
from the mobile sensors while still guaranteeing surveillance
specifications.
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